

**Q1** *Boogle*

(5 points)

Boogle is a social networking website that's looking into expanding into other domains. Namely, they recently started a map service to try their hand at fusing that with social media. The URL for the main website is <https://www.boogle.com>, and they want to host the map service at <https://maps.boogle.com>.

Q1.1 (1 point) For each of the following webpages, determine whether the webpage has the same origin as <http://boogle.com/index.html>, and provide a brief justification.

- i. <https://boogle.com/index.html>
- ii. <http://maps.boogle.com>
- iii. <http://boogle.com/home.html>
- iv. <http://maps.boogle.com:8080>

Q1.2 (1 point) Describe how to make a cookie that will be sent to only Boogle's map website and its subdomains.

Q1.3 (1 point) How can Boogle ensure that cookies are only transmitted encrypted so eavesdroppers on the network can't trivially learn the contents of the cookies?



(Question 1 continued...)

Q1.4 (1 point) Boogle wants to be able to host websites for users on their servers. They decide to host each user's website at [https://\[username\].boogle.com](https://[username].boogle.com). Why might this not be a good idea?

Q1.5 (1 point) Propose an alternate scheme so that Boogle can still host other users websites with less risk, and explain why this scheme is better.

Note: It is okay if the user sites interfere with each other, as long as they cannot affect official Boogle websites.

## Q2 Session Fixation

(2 points)

A *session cookie* is used by most websites in order to manage user logins. When the user logs in, the server sends a randomly-generated session cookie to the user's browser. The server also stores the cookie value in a database along with the corresponding username.

The user's browser sends the session cookie to the server whenever the user loads any page on the site. The server then looks the session cookie up in the database and retrieves the corresponding username. Using this, the server can know which user is logged in.

Some web application frameworks allow cookies to be set by the URL. For example, visiting the URL

`http://foobar.edu/page.html?sessionId=42`

will result in the server setting the `sessionId` cookie to the value "42".

Q2.1 (1 point) Can you spot an attack on this scheme?

Q2.2 (1 point) Suppose the problem you spotted has been fixed as follows: `foobar.edu` now establishes new sessions with session IDs based on a hash of the tuple (`username`, `time of connection`). Is this secure? If not, what would be a better approach?

### Q3 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

(5 points)

In a CSRF attack, a malicious user is able to take action on behalf of the victim. Consider the following example. Mallory posts the following in a comment on a chat forum:

```

```

Of course, Patsy-Bank won't let just anyone request a transaction on behalf of any given account name. Users first need to authenticate with a password. However, once a user has authenticated, Patsy-Bank associates their session ID with an authenticated session state.

Q3.1 (1 point) Explain what could happen when Alice visits the chat forum and views Mallory's comment.

Q3.2 (1 point) Patsy-Bank decides to check that the **Referer** header contains patsy-bank.com. Will the attack above work? Why or why not?

Q3.3 (1 point) Describe one way Mallory can modify her attack to always get around this check.

Q3.4 (1 point) Recall that the **Referer** header provides the full URL. HTTP additionally offers an **Origin** header which acts the same as the **Referer** but only includes the website domain, not the entire URL. Why might the **Origin** header be preferred?

Q3.5 (1 point) Almost all browsers support an additional cookie field **SameSite**. When **SameSite=strict**, the browser will only send the cookie if the requested domain **and** origin domain correspond to the cookie's domain. Which CSRF attacks will this stop? Which ones won't it stop? Give one big drawback of setting **SameSite=strict**.